



Green Infrastructure and Employment

An analytical report on how green infrastructure and public procurement can deliver inclusive employment in Nigeria



This report is developed as part of the Africa Policy Dialogue (APD) on *Catalyzing Green Jobs through Low Carbon Transition in Nigeria*, being implemented by the Advocacy for Policy and Innovation (API) in partnership with INCLUDE Knowledge Platform.

The APD seeks to institutionalize inclusive green job policies and create a structured workforce pipeline to support Nigeria's low-carbon transition and sustainable development goals in relation to energy diversification. A core focus of the project is enabling access to opportunities in the renewable and sustainable energy sector. This requires an understanding of the landscape, necessitating research development to inform legislative deliberations and guide stakeholder decision-making.



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1. Executive summary

Nigeria's low-carbon transition is usually presented as an environmental obligation. This report treats it as something more practical: one of the country's largest untapped sources of inclusive employment, on the condition that the transition is governed so that green investment is required to create jobs rather than merely permitted to. The distinction matters, because the evidence assembled here shows that the will and the awareness already exist, while the instruments that would convert investment into jobs do not.

The analysis rests on two complementary bodies of evidence. The first is a primary stakeholder survey of 294 respondents drawn from government, the private sector, academia, civil society and development partners. The second is the recent, verifiable national and international literature on Nigeria's energy transition, climate finance, renewable energy jobs and business environment, together with the country's primary policy instruments. The survey measures perception and institutional readiness; the external evidence supplies the magnitudes the survey could not, and is used throughout to test, qualify and extend what respondents reported.

Four conclusions stand out. First, awareness is high and optimism is strong, at about 78 percent and 86 percent respectively, but fewer than 15 percent of respondents believe current procurement frameworks embed any employment or inclusion requirement. The constraint is not appetite; it is institutionalisation. Second, respondents rank the dominance of fossil-fuel interests and the risk of greenwashing as the single largest barrier, at 95 percent, with weak institutional coordination close behind at 93 percent, a diagnosis the external literature independently confirms. Third, women and young people are largely shut out of the emerging green economy, with most reporting only minimal inclusion and women facing the highest outright exclusion, and the barriers are informational, cultural and financial rather than a deficit of ability. Fourth, the employment promise must be read with discipline: against projections of 340,000 jobs by 2030 and 840,000 by 2060, only about 50,000 renewable energy jobs have so far been realised.

The report's central argument is that public procurement is the keystone. It accounts for close to a third of national public expenditure, it sits upstream of jobs, inclusion and the integrity of green claims at the same time, and it is the one lever government already controls without needing new money or new institutions. The recommendations therefore centre on hard-wiring employment and inclusion targets into procurement and project finance, establishing verification to keep greenwashing out, tying skills development to live project pipelines, and funding a just transition for the workers the shift will displace. Handled this way, green infrastructure can move from an environmental cost to an engine of inclusive growth.

2. Introduction and context

Nigeria stands at a point where climate action, economic diversification and employment creation have to converge. It is Africa's most populous country, with about 233 million people, a median age close to 18 years, and roughly 63 percent of the population under the age of 25 ([UNFPA, 2024](#)). Several million young people reach the labour market every year. The economy remains anchored to hydrocarbons, which have historically provided the bulk of government revenue and around 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, while fossil fuels account for more than 80 percent of total energy consumption ([NCCC, 2025](#); [Okhirebhu et al., 2025](#)). Volatile oil markets, rising climate risk and international decarbonisation commitments are converging to make diversification urgent rather than optional.

The labour market itself must be read with care, because the headline numbers shifted abruptly when the National Bureau of Statistics adopted a revised methodology aligned with international practice. Under that approach the headline unemployment rate fell to about 4.3 percent in the second quarter of 2024 and youth unemployment for ages 15 to 24 to about 6.5 percent, down from rates above 30 percent under the previous method ([NBS, 2024](#)). The revision is widely contested, because it counts anyone working at least one hour a week as employed. The robust signals lie not in the headline rate but in the structure of work: informal employment runs at roughly 93 percent of the workforce, vulnerable employment is estimated at about 66 percent overall and close to 79 percent among women, and the share of young people not in education, employment or training sits above 12 percent ([NBS, 2024](#); [NCCC, 2025](#)). The binding problem is therefore the quality and inclusiveness of work, not a simple absence of any job, and that is the problem green infrastructure is positioned to address.

Infrastructure is the channel through which diversification has to flow. The revised National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan estimates that Nigeria needs about USD 2.3 trillion in infrastructure investment between 2020 and 2043, with energy and transport requiring the largest shares, and it expects the private sector to provide the majority of that capital ([NIIMP, 2020](#)). Public procurement, estimated at close to a third of national public expenditure, is the principal mechanism through which infrastructure investment is allocated, which makes it a powerful and largely unused instrument for shaping outcomes. At present it carries no statutory requirement for job creation or inclusive hiring in green projects, and contracts are awarded on financial capacity rather than on the employment they generate ([Public Procurement Act, 2007](#)).

Green infrastructure, for the purposes of this report, means the climate-resilient, low-carbon physical systems that an economy needs to function: renewable energy installations, sustainable transport, water and waste management, nature-based solutions, and energy-efficient public buildings, together with the climate-smart agriculture that supports rural livelihoods. These systems are an environmental necessity, but they are also an economic opportunity, because they generate employment across construction, installation, operation, maintenance, services and domestic manufacturing.

Nigeria already has the policy architecture to pursue this. The Nigeria Energy Transition Plan, the National Renewable Energy Action Plan, the Climate Change Act 2021, the Electricity Act 2023 and the Third Nationally Determined Contribution together set a coherent direction ([NCCC, 2025](#)). What the architecture lacks is the set of binding mechanisms that would ensure green investment translates directly into employment for youth and women. This report examines that gap. It asks how procurement systems, fiscal tools and compliance frameworks can be restructured so that green infrastructure becomes an engine of inclusive employment, and it presents concrete, sequenced reforms to achieve it.

3. Objectives and scope

The report pursues six objectives:

1. Evaluate the existing institutional, policy and procurement frameworks that govern green infrastructure.
2. Identify the barriers to, and opportunities for, employment within green-infrastructure development.
3. Assess the role of green infrastructure in catalysing employment during the low-carbon transition.
4. Examine the risks of greenwashing and the influence of fossil-fuel interests on the governance of green infrastructure.
5. Capture stakeholder perspectives on the drivers and inhibitors of green-infrastructure employment.
6. Propose concrete policy actions, fiscal incentives and compliance mechanisms to embed inclusive green job creation.

The scope is national and policy-focused. The report concentrates on the federal levers of procurement, fiscal policy and compliance, while recognising that delivery depends on coordination with states and on the practical realities faced by enterprises and workers.

4. Methodology

The study used a mixed-method, cross-sectional design built around a structured questionnaire that combined quantitative and qualitative items. The instrument carried Likert-scale questions to measure familiarity and agreement, yes or no questions to establish the presence or absence of specific mechanisms, and open-ended questions to capture barriers, gaps and recommendations in respondents' own words. It was organised in five sections covering demographic and institutional information, awareness and familiarity, the employment potential of green infrastructure, barriers and inclusion and policy effectiveness, and qualitative inputs and recommendations.

The questionnaire was administered both electronically and physically to ensure accessibility, with responses drawn from respondents in Abuja and Kaduna, and

validated for completeness before analysis. Respondents were drawn from four stakeholder groups: government officials across the relevant ministries, private-sector operators in renewable energy, agro-industry and waste management, academic and training institutions, and non-governmental organisations and development partners. The composition of the 294 respondents is set out below.

Respondent characteristic	Composition
Sector: private	30.6 percent
Sector: government	25.5 percent
Sector: non-governmental organisations	20.4 percent
Sector: academia	18.4 percent
Sector: development partners	5.1 percent
Age: 18 to 40 years	79.2 percent
Age: 41 to 60 years	20.1 percent
Gender: male / female	72.9 percent / 27.1 percent

Two features of the method shape how its results should be read. First, the survey measures perception and institutional readiness rather than realised job outcomes, since employment was inferred from stakeholder assessment rather than from project-level records. Second, the sample is weighted toward formal public and private actors and is male-dominated, with development partners, informal-sector workers and rural communities under-represented. These features do not weaken the survey; they define what it can and cannot establish. To compensate, this report triangulates every survey signal against independent evidence, and where the source material relied on macroeconomic figures that have since been superseded, those figures have been corrected against current data. The result is a reading in which perception and evidence are held against one another rather than either being taken at face value.

5. Findings

5.1 Awareness is high; institutionalisation is absent

Respondents are familiar with green infrastructure, at about 78 percent, and strongly optimistic about its employment potential, at about 86 percent, with average scores above four on a five-point scale and as high as five among development partners. Awareness rises with proximity to climate policy and finance, which is why development partners and the private sector score highest and parts of government and civil society slightly lower. The optimism is genuine and broadly shared across sectors.

That readiness does not reach into practice. Fewer than 15 percent of respondents in government, the private sector and academia agreed that current procurement

frameworks integrate employment or inclusion targets, only about 20 percent expressed strong support for green-infrastructure policy against 35 percent who were only weakly supportive, and only about 53 percent were aware of any policy that directly promotes green jobs. The gap between recognising an opportunity and embedding it in enforceable rules is the first and most consequential finding of the study.

5.2 A policy-practice gap, not a policy vacuum

It would be a mistake to read the low institutionalisation as an absence of policy. Nigeria's instruments are numerous and, on paper, ambitious. The difficulty is that they do not convert into outcomes. The peer-reviewed assessment of policy and regulatory barriers attributes this to weak enforcement, fragmented regulation and the absence of a coherent implementation regime, and the legal analysis of the net-zero framework reaches the same conclusion, pointing to fragmented environmental laws and weak institutional capacity ([Okhirebhu et al., 2025](#); [Olujobi et al., 2026](#)). The survey's finding that opportunities are recognised but not institutionalised is therefore corroborated by independent analysis of the instruments themselves. The problem is implementation, and implementation is mostly a question of who is accountable for what, and whether anyone checks.

5.3 Institutional fragmentation is the central systemic barrier

Asked to rank the barriers to green-infrastructure employment, respondents placed the dominance of fossil-fuel interests and greenwashing first, and weak institutional coordination a close second, ahead of the skills gap, weak policy enforcement and insufficient financing. The ranking is shown below.




Figure 1. Barriers to green-infrastructure employment, share of respondents citing each (survey, n = 294).

The prominence of coordination is striking, and it is strongly supported by the wider literature. The peer-reviewed assessment calls explicitly for a centralised regulatory

authority and stronger coordination between agencies; the legal analysis recommends a Just Transition Commission and the harmonisation of fragmented environmental laws into a single code; the climate finance landscape identifies institutional fragmentation as a structural weakness in how finance is governed; and the comparative work on small-enterprise greening finds fragmentation to be the most common implementation failure across countries ([Okhirebhu et al., 2025](#); [Olujobi et al., 2026](#); [Stout et al., 2025](#); [Krajcovicova, 2025](#)). When primary perception and four independent bodies of evidence converge on coordination, it should be treated as the first-order target for reform rather than one item among many.

5.4 Financing: a perceived barrier with measurable depth

Respondents identified insufficient financing as a major barrier, and the open-ended responses singled out private and non-governmental actors as those who struggle most to access capital for renewable energy and waste-to-energy projects. The survey could register the perception; the external evidence gives it both scale and a dimension respondents could not observe directly.

On scale, only about USD 2.5 billion in climate finance flowed in Nigeria in 2021/22 against an estimated annual need of about USD 29.7 billion, a gap of roughly USD 27 billion. International public finance, about 68 percent of the total, arrived mostly as debt, institutional investors contributed under 1 percent despite the size of the domestic pension market, and more than 80 percent of government revenue is absorbed by debt service, which limits the fiscal space for public co-investment ([Stout et al., 2025](#)). The Third Nationally Determined Contribution puts the investment requirement at USD 337 billion to 2035, around 80 percent of it expected from international sources ([NCCC, 2025](#)).

On the dimension respondents could not see, the cost of capital is inflated by the sovereign ceiling, under which a project's creditworthiness is tied to the sovereign rating, so that commercially sound renewable energy projects are priced as risky because of where they sit. Only two African sovereigns hold investment-grade ratings, renewable energy financing on the continent runs two to four times more expensive than in Europe or North America, subjective ratings are estimated to cost African countries up to USD 74.5 billion a year, and Nigeria's solar independent power producer pipeline is among those that have struggled to reach financial close ([Olingo, 2026](#)). The financing barrier therefore has two layers: a domestic-access layer, which is where the survey's small and non-governmental actors sit, and a macro-structural layer that no single firm can move. A concrete fiscal gap reinforces the point, since renewable equipment has been exempt from value-added tax since 2021 but the batteries that are the costliest component of a solar system are not, so the incentive regime does not yet reach the part that most determines affordability ([Stout et al., 2025](#); [Olujobi et al., 2026](#)).

5.5 Skills: a real gap, but the constraint is demand

Respondents rated the skills gap as the third most important barrier to employment, and academia in particular acknowledged a disconnect between curricula and the practical demands of the green economy. A more revealing signal sits in the inclusion data discussed below, where lack of skills ranked last among the barriers to participation. The study's own reading is that the issue is less about capability and more about opportunity and access, and the external evidence supports that nuance. The field study of renewable energy jobs finds that around 70 percent of formal positions require skilled qualifications and that training provision is fragmented and underfunded, while the national job projections are themselves conditional on a skills supply that does not yet exist at scale ([Manya, 2023](#); [NCCC, 2025](#)). The comparative literature offers a direct warning: in Malaysia's value-chain greening programme, nearly two-thirds of trained firms disengaged in the absence of sustained demand and follow-up ([Krajcovicova, 2025](#)). The lesson is that training divorced from live projects does not convert into employment, so the binding constraint is the demand-side pipeline rather than raw training capacity.

5.6 Inclusion and equity: the study's strongest contribution

The survey's most valuable primary evidence concerns who is included. Both women and young people report mostly minimal involvement in green initiatives, and women face the highest outright exclusion. The pattern is shown below.




Figure 2. Perceived inclusion of youth and women in green-infrastructure initiatives (survey, n = 294).

Only about 31 percent of youth and 35 percent of women report being highly or moderately included, while 56 percent of youth and 46 percent of women describe their inclusion as minimal. Women face the higher rate of outright exclusion, at about 19 percent against 12 percent for youth, which points to deeper structural and cultural barriers to their participation. The barriers respondents identified form a clear hierarchy.




Figure 3. Barriers limiting the participation of women and youth in green-infrastructure jobs (survey, $n = 294$).

Lack of information leads at 95 percent, followed by cultural and gender norms and lack of access to finance, with lack of skills ranked last. The hierarchy is itself the finding: people are not excluded because they cannot do the work, but because they do not learn of opportunities, face social barriers to taking them up, and cannot finance their participation. The external record reinforces this. The field study finds that women held about 27 percent and young people about 40 percent of the roughly 50,000 renewable energy jobs realised to date, with wage parity but a marked participation gap, and the comparative evidence shows that women-led and youth-led enterprises face the standard barriers more acutely, with only about 38 percent of small firms across Sub-Saharan Africa having adapted to environmental risk against 60 percent of large firms ([Manyà, 2023](#); [Krajcovicova, 2025](#)). At the macro level, vulnerable employment reaches close to 79 percent among women ([NCCC, 2025](#)). The implication is unambiguous: because the barriers are systemic rather than individual, inclusion will not occur by default and must be designed into procurement and finance rather than left to supply-side training or exhortation.

5.7 Fossil-fuel dominance and the greenwashing risk

More than 85 percent of respondents warned that renewable energy projects are increasingly pursued by fossil-fuel interests for branding and compliance rather than genuine transformation, and the same concern topped the barrier ranking. Respondents noted that contracts are often awarded on financial capacity rather than on inclusive employment outcomes, which is precisely the condition under which a symbolic green project can substitute for a transformative one. This is easy to dismiss as cynicism, but the external evidence suggests it is structurally grounded. Nigeria's own frameworks lean on natural gas as a transition fuel, with consumption projected to rise before declining toward mid-century, and both the legal and climate-finance literature note that this sits in tension with the net-zero commitment and risks creating stranded assets while crowding out durable renewable investment ([Olujobi et al., 2026](#); [Stout et](#)

[al., 2025](#); [NCCCC, 2025](#)). Because oil and gas still provide most revenue and foreign exchange, fossil interests retain real fiscal and political weight. The risk the survey identifies is therefore a genuine governance risk, and the appropriate response is verification rather than trust.

5.8 The employment payoff, read with discipline

The optimism the survey records is warranted as a statement of potential, but it should not be read as a statement of delivery. The Energy Transition Plan projects about 340,000 jobs by 2030 and 840,000 by 2060, the circular economy could add more than 250,000, and Solar Power Naija was designed to create roughly 250,000 ([NCCCC, 2025](#); [REA, 2020](#)). Against these ceilings, the most rigorous field count records about 50,000 direct renewable energy jobs realised to date, of which 27 percent are held by women and 40 percent by young people ([Manya, 2023](#)). The distance between projection and realisation is the discipline a credible strategy must accept. The large numbers are conditional on the manufacturing localisation, the demand-linked skills pipeline and the procurement and finance reforms set out later in this report, and near-term targets should be measured against observed delivery rather than against aspiration.

6. Discussion: what the evidence establishes

Read together, the two streams of evidence do more than agree. They locate the problem precisely. The survey establishes that informed actors across every sector are ready for a green-jobs transition, see its potential clearly, and identify coordination, financing, skills, inclusion and greenwashing as the binding constraints. The external literature confirms each of those signals with independent analysis and supplies the magnitudes the survey could not measure: the size of the finance gap, the external cost-of-capital penalty, the distance between projected and realised jobs, and the scale of the workforce the transition will displace. Convergence of this kind, between primary perception and multiple independent sources, raises confidence that the diagnosis is correct rather than an artefact of any one method.

The analytically important move is to see how the constraints relate to one another, because they are not a flat list of equal items. Public procurement is the keystone. It sits upstream of three of the problems at once. It determines whether projects are required to create jobs and to include women and youth, so it is the lever for employment and inclusion. It determines whether contracts are awarded on inclusive outcomes or merely on financial capacity, so it is also the first line of defence against greenwashing, since a contract that must demonstrate verified jobs and community benefit is far harder to use as a branding exercise. And because procurement is government's own instrument, accounting for close to a third of public expenditure, acting on it requires neither new money nor new institutions, only the political decision to attach conditions to spending that is already happening. This is why the report treats procurement reform as the organising spine of its recommendations rather than as one intervention among many.

The financing and skills findings then need reframing in light of the evidence. On financing, the survey's barrier is real but it is two problems wearing one label. The domestic-access problem, which keeps small and women-led and youth-led firms out, calls for tailored instruments, guarantees and a green innovation fund. The macro-structural problem, the sovereign ceiling, calls for credit enhancement and blended finance from regional and development institutions that can partially separate a project's risk from the sovereign's. Treating the two as a single financing barrier would lead to instruments that solve neither. On skills, the survey's own ranking, which places capability last among inclusion barriers, points away from a classroom-supply response and toward tying training to live projects, recognition of prior learning and demand created by the procurement reforms themselves. Skills follow demand; they do not precede it.

The table below states each principal survey signal, the independent evidence that bears on it, and what the two together establish.

Stakeholder survey signal	What the external evidence shows	What the synthesis establishes
High awareness (78%) and optimism (86%)	Architecture exists but enforcement is weak and regulation fragmented (Okhirebhu et al., 2025 ; Olujobi et al., 2026)	Awareness is not the constraint; institutionalisation is
Weak institutional coordination (93%)	Convergent calls for a central authority and harmonised governance (Okhirebhu et al., 2025 ; Olujobi et al., 2026 ; Krajcovicova, 2025 ; Stout et al., 2025)	Coordination is the first-order barrier
Insufficient financing (76%)	USD 2.5bn flows against USD 29.7bn need; under 1% from institutional investors; sovereign ceiling adds 2 to 4 times the cost (Stout et al., 2025 ; Olingo, 2026)	Two layers: domestic access and a macro penalty; use different instruments for each
Skills gap (80% of employment; last among inclusion barriers)	About 70% of formal jobs need qualifications; training fragmented; targets conditional on skills (Manya, 2023 ; NCCC, 2025)	Tie training to live projects; demand, not capability, is the limit
Women and youth only minimally included; women more excluded	Women 27% and youth 40% of about 50,000 jobs; women-led firms face deeper barriers (Manya, 2023 ; Krajcovicova, 2025)	Hard-wire participation into procurement and finance
Fossil dominance and greenwashing (95%; 85%)	Gas-as-transition-fuel tension and stranded-asset risk; fossil interests retain fiscal weight (Olujobi et al., 2026 ; Stout et al., 2025 ; NCCC, 2025)	A real governance risk; require verification and fund the just transition
Optimism that green infrastructure creates jobs (86%)	Target of 340,000 by 2030 and 840,000 by 2060 against about 50,000 realised (NCCC, 2025 ; Manya, 2023 ; REA, 2020)	Treat projections as ceilings; measure against delivery

7. Limitations

Several limitations bound the interpretation of these findings, and they are the reason the analysis leans on triangulation rather than on the survey alone. The sample, though distributed across the relevant sectors, was limited in size and drawn from Abuja and Kaduna, so it under-represents informal-sector actors, rural communities and grassroots workers who are central to green job creation. The survey relied on self-reported perceptions, which can reflect organisational interest or aspiration rather than implementation reality. Direct, project-level data linking green infrastructure to measured employment in Nigeria remains scarce, so employment potential was inferred from stakeholder assessment and from the external literature rather than from verified job counts. Because many of the policies and programmes cited are still in early implementation, the findings represent a snapshot rather than a settled record. And external conditions, including currency movements, shifting subsidies and changes in political priority, will affect the scalability of any green-infrastructure investment. None of these limitations overturns the central conclusions, which are corroborated by independent evidence, but they do counsel against reading the survey percentages as precise measurements rather than as strong directional signals.

8. Recommendations

The recommendations translate the analysis into action. They are designed to use the instruments government already controls, they are organised around procurement as the keystone, and they are sequenced across short, medium and long horizons. Each is assigned a lead so that accountability is explicit, since diffuse ownership is itself one of the problems the evidence identifies.

8.1 Make procurement the engine of inclusive jobs

- Require a Green Job Implementation Plan, setting out job-creation and inclusion targets, as a condition for approving any publicly financed green-infrastructure project, with minimum participation of 30 percent women and 30 percent youth and disaggregated reporting against those targets.
- Amend the Public Procurement Act to embed green-job criteria, local-labour participation mandates and the inclusion of women-owned and youth-led enterprises in infrastructure tenders, so that inclusive employment becomes an award criterion rather than an afterthought.
- Introduce a Green Procurement Certification Scheme that requires contractors to report workforce composition and employment outcomes, and make the certification a precondition for bidding on public green projects.

8.2 Build accountability and guard against greenwashing

- Establish a Compliance and Monitoring Unit and a National Green Jobs Registry under the National Council on Climate Change, with mandatory annual public reporting of the employment generated by green-infrastructure projects, disaggregated by gender and age.

- Require contractors and fossil-fuel firms to disclose how their renewable projects contribute to employment, emissions reduction and community benefit, and empower the Council to audit and certify projects to confirm authenticity.
- Make fiscal incentives conditional on documented job creation, inclusion and emissions reduction, and introduce penalties for misreporting or non-compliance, so that incentives reward outcomes rather than intentions.

8.3 Reform financing for both layers of the problem

- Introduce tax credits, duty waivers and accelerated depreciation tied to verified job creation in renewable energy, green construction and the circular economy, and extend the value-added tax exemption to solar batteries and other high-cost storage components.
- Establish Green Infrastructure Employment Bonds earmarked for job-intensive projects and a Green Jobs Innovation Fund for small enterprises, cooperatives and social enterprises, addressing the domestic-access layer of the financing constraint.
- Expand guarantees, blended finance and credit enhancement in partnership with development finance institutions and regional bodies such as Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank, to offset the sovereign-ceiling penalty that no single firm can move ([Olingo, 2026](#); [Stout et al., 2025](#)).

8.4 Tie skills to demand, and build local content

- Tie technical and vocational training to live project pipelines, embed apprenticeships in infrastructure contracts, and align curricula and recognised certification with green trades, so that training follows real demand rather than preceding it.
- Establish green skills centres in each geopolitical zone to widen access for under-served populations, and develop national certification standards for solar installers, energy auditors, waste-management technicians and green-construction professionals.
- Enforce local manufacturing and assembly of renewable-energy components through fiscal incentives, and establish green industrial zones for solar assembly, battery manufacturing and recycling that are linked to domestic employment.

8.5 Make inclusion deliberate, and fund the just transition

- Provide dedicated training, grants and mentorship for women and youth in renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture and waste-to-energy, and run sustained information campaigns through radio, social and community channels to close the information gap that respondents ranked the single largest barrier to participation.
- Fund a just transition with social protection, re-skilling and enterprise support for the workers the shift will displace, recognising the roughly 65,000 oil and gas jobs that are exposed and the very large informal workforce in the firewood and

charcoal economy that the climate plan intends to shrink ([NCCC, 2025](#); [Manyà, 2023](#)).

The table below summarises the priority actions, their lead institutions and their horizon.

Priority action	Lead institutions	Horizon
Green Job Implementation Plans and 30/30 women and youth quotas as a condition of project approval	NCCC, Bureau of Public Procurement, MDAs	Short
Verification and disclosure of project employment, emissions and community outcomes	NCCC	Short
Amend the Public Procurement Act for green-job, local-labour and inclusion criteria	BPP, National Assembly	Medium
Green Procurement Certification, incentives tied to verified outcomes, penalties for misreporting	BPP, Federal Ministry of Finance, FIRS	Medium
Compliance and Monitoring Unit and National Green Jobs Registry, with annual reporting	NCCC	Medium
Training tied to live project pipelines; curricula and certification aligned to green trades	Federal Ministries of Education and Labour, NBTE, NAPITN, ITF	Medium
Green Infrastructure Employment Bonds and a Green Jobs Innovation Fund; guarantees and blended finance	Federal Ministry of Finance, CBN, DMO, DFIs	Long
Green industrial zones for local content; VAT exemption extended to solar batteries	Federal Ministries of Industry and Finance, NIPC	Long
Green skills centres in each geopolitical zone, with embedded apprenticeships	NCCC, state governments, NBTE	Long
Funded just transition: social protection and re-skilling for displaced workers	NCCC, Federal Ministries of Labour and Environment	Long

9. Conclusion

Nigeria does not need to wait for new money or new ministries to turn its green transition into jobs. The evidence in this report shows that the appetite is already present across government, industry, academia and civil society, and that the obstacles are a matter of design rather than of will. The country's largest unused instrument, public procurement, can be made to require the jobs and the inclusion that green investment is otherwise free to ignore. Verification can keep the integrity of green claims intact. Financing can be reformed on both of its layers at once. Skills can be tied to the demand that procurement creates. And a funded just transition can ensure that the workers the shift displaces are carried with it rather than left behind.

The transition will not deliver inclusive employment on its own, and the same investment can either catalyse a broad-based green economy or entrench the inequalities and the fossil-era political economy it is meant to replace. Which of those outcomes Nigeria gets depends less on the volume of green infrastructure than on the

rules attached to it. If the reforms set out here are adopted, particularly those on procurement, accountability, inclusion and the just transition, the low-carbon transition can become one of the most powerful engines of inclusive growth available to the country.

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Note on sources: the survey data reported throughout is the study's own primary evidence. External figures are drawn only from the verified sources listed above and the cited primary instruments. Labour-market and infrastructure figures were updated to reflect the National Bureau of Statistics methodology adopted in 2023 and the reviewed master plan. No unverified secondary citations have been carried forward.