



# Policy Coherence and Integration

How the alignment of energy, labour and education policy can catalyse green jobs in Nigeria



This report is developed as part of the Africa Policy Dialogue (APD) on *Catalyzing Green Jobs through Low Carbon Transition in Nigeria*, being implemented by the Advocacy for Policy and Innovation (API) in partnership with INCLUDE Knowledge Platform.

The APD seeks to institutionalize inclusive green job policies and create a structured workforce pipeline to support Nigeria's low-carbon transition and sustainable development goals in relation to energy diversification. A core focus of the project is enabling access to opportunities in the renewable and sustainable energy sector. This requires an understanding of the landscape, necessitating research development to inform legislative deliberations and guide stakeholder decision-making.



## Table of content

|                                                              |           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>1. Executive summary</b>                                  | <b>4</b>  |
| <b>2. Introduction and purpose</b>                           | <b>4</b>  |
| <b>3. Approach</b>                                           | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>4. The policy and institutional architecture</b>          | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>5. The scale of the opportunity, read with discipline</b> | <b>6</b>  |
| <b>6. What the survey shows</b>                              | <b>7</b>  |
| 6.1 High awareness, low clarity                              | 7         |
| 6.2 Weak coherence and ad hoc coordination                   | 8         |
| 6.3 Labour at the margin, capacity uneven                    | 8         |
| 6.4 A skills system out of step                              | 9         |
| 6.5 Coherence predicts delivery                              | 9         |
| <b>7. Discussion: what the evidence establishes</b>          | <b>9</b>  |
| <b>8. Recommendations</b>                                    | <b>10</b> |
| <b>9. Conclusion</b>                                         | <b>11</b> |
| <b>References</b>                                            | <b>12</b> |

## 1. Executive summary

This study asks whether Nigeria's low-carbon transition can be made to create green jobs, and finds that the obstacle is not ambition but integration. The country has assembled a comparatively strong architecture of energy and climate policy, yet energy, labour and education policy are not aligned, labour considerations sit at the margin of energy planning, and the institutions meant to coordinate the whole remain weak where it matters most. The transition is constrained less by what is on paper than by the machinery to deliver it.

The evidence has two parts. A desk review maps the policy, legal and institutional landscape and the green-jobs potential across sectors. An expert survey of 20 senior stakeholders, spanning federal and state government, the private sector, civil society, development partners and academia, then tests how that architecture performs in practice. The survey is small and purposive, so its results are directional rather than statistically representative, but its respondents are experienced, with three quarters holding more than six years in the field, and its signals are consistent and corroborated by the wider literature.

Four findings stand out. Awareness of the policies is high, but clarity on how they create jobs is low: only a quarter of respondents found the policies clear on green-job pathways. Coherence across energy, labour and education is weak to moderate, with most respondents reporting overlaps and conflicts and describing inter-ministerial coordination as ad hoc and donor-driven. Labour is only partially integrated into energy policy, and least of all at the state level, where capacity is weakest. And the data reveal a clear relationship between coherence and results: where respondents judged policies well aligned, programmes were judged effective, and where alignment broke down, so did delivery.

The report's central argument follows from this. The highest-leverage reform is to institutionalise coordination and to place employment at the centre of energy decisions, in effect to labour-proof every major transition policy and project, while building the capacity of subnational institutions and aligning skills systems with real demand. The eight recommendations that close the report are organised around that idea, and are framed so that headline job projections are treated as ceilings to be earned through delivery rather than as outcomes already secured.

## 2. Introduction and purpose

Nigeria's low-carbon transition is a development strategy as much as an environmental one. Framed by the 2050 Long-Term Vision and operationalised through the Energy Transition Plan, it seeks to widen energy access, diversify an economy long dependent on oil and gas, and slow carbon accumulation, while opening the prospect of large-scale green employment. The opportunity is real, but so are the costs of a poorly managed transition, including revenue and job losses in fossil-dependent communities and the dislocation that can follow ([Carley and Konisky, 2020](#); [Adewuyi et al., 2020](#)).

One question has received too little attention: how to weave labour-based incentives and green-job creation into the regulatory, policy and institutional fabric of the transition. Energy policy, employment policy and education policy are designed and run largely apart from one another, so the employment promise of the transition risks going unrealised even where the climate ambition is met. This study addresses that gap. It reviews the policy and institutional frameworks of Nigeria's energy transition, identifies their strengths, weaknesses, convergences and divergences, and assesses how far they are positioned to deliver decent green jobs, with particular attention to the alignment of national employment and education plans with energy policy ([Okoha and Okpanachi, 2023](#); [Okereke et al., 2022](#)).

### 3. Approach

The study used a mixed-methods design combining political-economy analysis with field research. A desk review mapped the policy, legal and institutional architecture and the sectoral potential for green jobs. Qualitative fieldwork followed, through semi-structured interviews and stakeholder consultations with actors in relevant ministries, professional associations, civil society and the legislature. These were triangulated against a structured expert survey of 20 purposively selected respondents drawn in balanced proportions from six stakeholder groups: federal and state government, the private sector, civil society, development partners and academia.

The survey is best read as an elite or expert sounding rather than a representative sample. Its strength is the seniority of its respondents, with 75 percent holding more than six years of experience and a concentration of expertise in climate and energy policy. Its limitation is size, and a relative under-weighting of labour and education specialists, which the analysis notes where relevant. Throughout, the survey's signals are checked against the documentary record and the wider evidence base, so that conclusions rest on the convergence of sources rather than on any single small sample.

### 4. The policy and institutional architecture

Nigeria's transition framework is, on paper, robust. It has evolved from broad vision to binding law and sector-specific strategy, and recent additions have begun to bring employment and social inclusion into the core of energy policy. The most significant instruments are summarised below.

| Instrument                                              | Role                                                                                                        | Principal gap                                                                                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2050 Long-Term Vision and Energy Transition Plan (2022) | Apex vision and flagship roadmap; universal access by 2030, net zero by 2060; projects 340,000 jobs by 2030 | Job target is aspirational and not costed; reliance on gas as a transition fuel creates tension |
| Climate Change Act (2021) and the NCCC                  | Binding law; carbon budgeting; creates the apex coordinating body for climate governance                    | Coordination depends on the cooperation and capacity of sectoral ministries it cannot direct    |

| Instrument                                                               | Role                                                                                                        | Principal gap                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Electricity Act (2023) and National Integrated Electricity Policy (2025) | Devolves power to states; policy adds local content, inclusion and low-carbon goals                         | Implementation in its infancy; needs state-level regulation and capacity to be real      |
| Just Transition Guidelines and Action Plan (validated 2025)              | Sector-specific people-centred framework for jobs and worker protection, built with the ILO and UN agencies | Guidance, not binding law; success hinges on adoption and funding by sectoral ministries |
| Nationally Determined Contributions (2022)                               | Internationally binding pledges; gateway to climate finance                                                 | Gap between ambition and the domestic budgets and frameworks meant to deliver it         |
| National Employment Policy and LEEP (2025)                               | Embeds green jobs in the employment mandate; LEEP already trains in CNG and renewables                      | New; requires institutional collaboration with the NCCC and energy ministries to scale   |

Two coordinating innovations sit above this architecture. The National Council on Climate Change, created by the Climate Change Act, is designed to break the silos that have long divided Nigerian governance, and its leadership of the Just Transition Guidelines and Action Plan, validated in 2025 with support from the ILO, UNDP and UNIDO, shows it can convene inclusive, multi-stakeholder processes ([Idowu, 2025](#)). The Energy Transition Office, in the Office of the Vice President, carries the political weight to mobilise investment for the plan. The weakness common to both is structural: they coordinate, but implementation rests with sectoral ministries they cannot command, so their effect depends on sustained political backing and on the willingness of line ministries to act. The Just Transition Guidelines and Action Plan is the pivotal instrument for this study, because it provides an explicit mandate to link energy investment with employment, but it is guidance rather than law, and its value will be decided by whether ministries fund and adopt it ([George-Ikoli and Chinery, 2024](#)).

## 5. The scale of the opportunity, read with discipline

The sectoral potential for green jobs is large and widely distributed. As reported in the national press, the UNDP and ILO Nigeria Green Job Assessment projects that climate policies could create up to 14.1 million green jobs by 2035, spanning power, agriculture and forestry, transport, manufacturing, waste and water ([Uwagbulam and Gbonegun, 2024](#)). The modelled sectoral contributions are summarised below.

| Sector                   | Modelled green-jobs potential to 2035 (Nigeria Green Job Assessment)                                                                                 |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Power                    | Largest single contributor, around 12 million net jobs by 2035, driven by construction and installation tied to roughly USD 80 billion of investment |
| Agriculture and forestry | Highest job multiplier; forestry alone near 290 full-time equivalents per USD million; a 25 million tree programme modelled at about 20,000 jobs     |

| Sector          | Modelled green-jobs potential to 2035 (Nigeria Green Job Assessment)                                       |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Manufacturing   | Cement policies modelled at around 800,000 jobs; iron and steel efficiency at around 65,000                |
| Transport       | A shift to public transit modelled at around 25,000 net jobs, alongside CNG and EV servicing               |
| Water and waste | Water efficiency at around 35,000 jobs; recycling and the circular economy growing quickly from a low base |

These figures are modelled projections, and they should be read as ceilings of potential rather than as jobs in hand. Against them, the most rigorous field count to date records about 50,000 renewable energy jobs realised so far, of which 27 percent are held by women and 40 percent by young people, and the Energy Transition Plan's own near-term target is 340,000 jobs by 2030 ([Manya, 2023](#); [NCCCC, 2025](#)). The distance between a 14.1 million projection and 50,000 realised is precisely the gap this study seeks to explain. A concrete supply-side signal underlines the point: the House of Representatives Committee on Renewable Energy reports that nearly half of the skilled-labour needs of the renewable energy sector go unmet, with employers unable to hire qualified technicians and engineers ([Osuoha, 2025](#)). The potential is real, but it is conditional on coherence, financing and skills, which is where the empirical findings turn.

## 6. What the survey shows

### 6.1 High awareness, low clarity

Familiarity with the transition policies is high: 95 percent of respondents were at least moderately familiar and half were very familiar, with the Energy Transition Plan and the Climate Change Act the most widely recognised. That awareness does not extend to employment. Only a quarter judged the policies clear on how green jobs would be created, while 45 percent found them only somewhat clear and a further 30 percent found them unclear or silent on the question. Respondents who saw clarity pointed to quantified targets in renewable energy and clean cooking; those who did not pointed to the absence of implementation strategies, timelines and worker-transition pathways. The paradox is captured below: awareness sits well above every measure of how clearly or coherently the policies translate into jobs.




Figure 1. Share of 20 experts giving the most positive rating on each dimension. Familiarity is high; every coherence and integration measure is low.

## 6.2 Weak coherence and ad hoc coordination

Alignment across energy, labour and education was judged weak to moderate by 85 percent of respondents, with only one in ten describing the policies as highly aligned. Inter-ministerial collaboration drew a similar picture: 15 percent called it very effective, while 40 percent found it ineffective or absent. The mechanisms respondents named, inter-ministerial committees, periodic consultations and donor-facilitated programmes, were described as ad hoc, discontinuous and dependent on external rather than domestic systems. Six in ten respondents reported active overlaps, inconsistencies or conflicts between policies, citing duplicated renewable-energy mandates, labour policies that fail to provide transition pathways, and education programmes out of step with the skills energy policy implies. This is the structural fragmentation that the wider literature also identifies as the central barrier to delivery ([Okoha and Okpanachi, 2023](#)).

## 6.3 Labour at the margin, capacity uneven

Labour is not yet built into energy policy. Only 15 percent of respondents reported full integration of labour considerations, while half reported minimal or no integration. The pattern by institution is telling. Federal actors reported partial integration, development partners the highest integration, and state government and academia the lowest, with most state respondents reporting minimal or no integration at all. The same imbalance appears in capacity: federal institutions were judged moderate, development partners strongest, and state institutions weak or very weak, with civil society and academia also constrained. Because subnational institutions are where national policy meets the ground, and where the Electricity Act 2023 now devolves real responsibility, weakness there is a first-order risk. That development partners show both the strongest capacity and the deepest labour integration is a warning in itself, since it suggests the green-jobs agenda is being carried from outside rather than owned from within, which raises a question about how sustainable current progress will prove.



## 6.4 A skills system out of step

No respondent judged the education and training system strongly aligned with the needs of the green economy; 60 percent called it only somewhat aligned and 40 percent not aligned at all. Partnerships between government, academia and industry exist, reported by 70 percent, but they have not closed the gap between what is taught and what the sector needs. The skills respondents flagged as scarce were practical and specific: solar installation and maintenance, energy efficiency and sustainable construction, digital and data skills for modern grids, and the entrepreneurial and policy skills needed to build and govern green enterprises. This misalignment, set against the unmet skilled-labour need noted earlier, is a direct constraint on how fast the sector can grow.

## 6.5 Coherence predicts delivery

The most important analytical result links the strands together. When programme effectiveness is set against policy alignment, the relationship is stark. Every respondent in well-aligned settings reported effective programmes, while in weakly aligned settings half reported outright failure, and where alignment was absent, failure was total. The categories at the extremes contain few cases and should be read with care, but the gradient is consistent across the sample and matches the qualitative accounts.




Figure 2. Programme effectiveness by policy alignment ( $n = 20$ ; some categories contain few cases). Effectiveness falls sharply as alignment weakens.

Read together, the survey establishes that the binding constraint is not the absence of policy but the absence of coherence, labour integration and institutional strength to turn policy into employment. That is the problem the recommendations address.

## 7. Discussion: what the evidence establishes

The findings converge on a single diagnosis. Nigeria's transition is held back by a paradox of visibility without operability: the policies are known but do not tell institutions how to create jobs, because employment is treated as an aspiration rather than designed into the instruments. Weak coherence then compounds the problem, since energy, labour and education policy run on separate tracks, and the data show

that this is not a presentational concern but a determinant of results, with alignment and programme effectiveness moving together. Labour sits at the margin of energy decisions, most of all at the subnational level, and the fact that the deepest integration is found among development partners suggests the agenda is externally driven and therefore vulnerable. Capacity is unevenly distributed in a way that leaves implementation dependent on the actors least accountable to Nigerian voters.

The analytically useful move is to see that these are not separate problems but symptoms of one missing function: nobody owns the join between energy investment and employment. The highest-leverage response is therefore to institutionalise that function, in effect to labour-proof the transition, so that every major energy policy and project carries a corresponding plan for local content, skills and jobs, and so that the National Council on Climate Change and the Energy Transition Office are mandated and resourced to enforce it in concert with the Ministry of Labour. This reframes the other constraints rather than competing with them. Financing, for instance, is not only scarce in aggregate, with climate finance flows far below the level the transition requires, but is also skewed toward infrastructure with no dedicated stream for the social and labour side of the transition, for reskilling oil workers or supporting affected communities ([Stout et al., 2025](#); [NCCC, 2025](#)). Skills, likewise, will not follow from training in isolation; they follow from demand created when projects are required to hire and build local capability.

Set against the verified record, the study's optimism needs discipline rather than dismissal. The 14.1 million projection is a useful statement of potential, but with about 50,000 jobs realised to date and a 2030 target of 340,000, the credible near-term path runs through delivery, not headline ambition ([Manya, 2023](#); [NCCC, 2025](#)). Treated this way, the transition remains one of the largest employment opportunities available to the country, provided the integration deficit at the heart of these findings is closed.

## 8. Recommendations

The recommendations translate the diagnosis into action. They are sequenced across short, medium and long horizons, and each carries a clear lead so that ownership of the integration function is explicit.

| Priority action                                                                                                                            | Lead institutions                                          | Horizon |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Mandate labour-proofing: require every major energy policy and project to carry a costed jobs, local-content and skills plan               | NCCC, Energy Transition Office, Federal Ministry of Labour | Short   |
| Adopt a single national green-jobs framework that links energy policy to employment, reskilling and just-transition protections            | NCCC, Federal Ministry of Labour                           | Short   |
| Institutionalise coordination through clear mandates, standing inter-ministerial structures and accountability, replacing ad hoc platforms | NCCC, Energy Transition Office                             | Medium  |
| Reform skills: align TVET and university curricula with green trades and tie training to live project pipelines                            | Federal Ministries of Education and Labour, NBTE, ITF      | Medium  |

| Priority action                                                                                                                            | Lead institutions                                      | Horizon |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Build subnational capacity: targeted technical, administrative and financial support for state institutions under the Electricity Act 2023 | Federal and state governments, development partners    | Medium  |
| Earmark financing for the just transition and green enterprise, not infrastructure alone, with incentives for private participation        | Federal Ministry of Finance, CBN, development partners | Medium  |
| Make participation inclusive by design for youth, women and vulnerable groups, with social protection embedded in programmes               | NCCC, Federal Ministries of Labour and Environment     | Long    |
| Stand up monitoring, evaluation and green-jobs data, with shared indicators and feedback into policy                                       | NCCC, National Bureau of Statistics, Energy Commission | Long    |

## 9. Conclusion

Nigeria's low-carbon transition is not short of ambition or of policy. It is short of the integration and institutional strength needed to turn that ambition into decent work. The evidence here shows that where energy, labour and education policy are aligned, programmes succeed, and where they are not, they fail, and that labour and the institutions closest to delivery remain the weakest parts of the system. The remedy is to make integration a deliberate function of government rather than an accident of donor effort: to labour-proof the transition, build capacity where it is thinnest, fund the just transition, and align skills with real demand. Handled this way, the transition can begin to convert its large projected potential into the jobs that would make it just.

## References

- Adewuyi, O.B. et al. (2020) 'Challenges and prospects of Nigeria's sustainable energy transition with lessons from other countries' experiences', *Energy Reports*, 6, pp. 993 to 1009.
- Carley, S. and Konisky, D.M. (2020) 'The justice and equity implications of the clean energy transition', *Nature Energy*, 5, pp. 569 to 577.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Policy; (2021) Climate Change Act; (2022) Energy Transition Plan; (2023) Electricity Act. Abuja.
- George-Ikoli, T. and Chinery, N. (2024) Guidebook on Nigeria's Energy Transition. Natural Resource Governance Institute.
- Idowu, O. / *EnviroNews Nigeria* (2025) 'Nigeria's Just Transition Guidelines and Action Plan: pathways for sustainable growth'. *EnviroNews Nigeria*.
- Manyá, V. (2023) Decent Jobs for Youth and Women in Nigeria's Low-Carbon Transition. INCLUDE Knowledge Platform.
- National Council on Climate Change (2025) Nigeria's Third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0). Abuja.
- New Telegraph (2025) 'APMT unveils \$830m green ports plan to FG'. *New Telegraph*, 6 July.
- Okereke, C., Nwajiaku-Dahou, K., Gencsu, I., Omoju, O. and Walls, G. (2022) Five Opportunities for Nigeria to Lead a Clean and Just Energy Transition. ODI.
- Okoha, A.S. and Okpanachi, E. (2023) 'Transcending energy transition complexities in building a carbon-neutral economy: the case of Nigeria', *Cleaner Energy Systems*, 2.
- Osuoha, I. / *EnviroNews Nigeria* (2025) '50% of renewable energy skilled labour needs unmet in Nigeria'. *EnviroNews Nigeria*, 25 July.
- Stout, S., Gupta, I., Balm, A. and Meattle, C. (2025) Landscape of Climate Finance in Nigeria 2025. Climate Policy Initiative for FSD Africa.
- Uwagbulam, C. and Gbonegun, V. (2024) 'Climate policies target 14.1 million green jobs by 2035'. *The Guardian Nigeria*, 22 July.
- World Economic Forum (2023) Mobilizing Investments for Clean Energy in Nigeria. Community Paper. Expert stakeholder survey (n = 20), Policy Coherence and Integration study, 2025 (primary data).
- Note on sources: the survey data (n = 20) is the study's own primary evidence, reported as directional given the purposive design. The 14.1 million figure is a modelled projection attributed to its source and triangulated against the realised field count. Macroeconomic and labour figures were checked against current data, and only verified or genuine sources are cited.*